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Abstract
Everettian Quantum Mechanics, or the Many Worlds Interpretation,
has no Born rule, and lacks a valid explanation for quantum probabilities.
We show their values are the factors by which 2-dimensional Lebesgue
measures contract under orthogonal projections in complex Hilbert spaces,
and that the unit total probability condition corresponds to a Pythagorean
theorem for such measures. From this and two simple, yet unorthodox,
physical assumptions, we obtain that those factors give, in the set of worlds
originating from a quantum measurement, the fractions corresponding to
each result. These are associated to probabilities, in both the frequentist
and Bayesian views, solving the probability problem of Everett’s theory.
This allows its preferred basis problem to be solved as well, and may help
settle questions about the nature of probability in general.
Keywords: foundations of quantum mechanics, Everett interpreta-
tion, many worlds interpretation, Born rule, interpretations of probability
1 Introduction
Since the early days of Quantum Mechanics, its probabilistic nature has
baffled many physicists, most notoriously Albert Einstein. This motivated
alternatives to the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
(CQM), like hidden-variables theories, which have not been so successful.
Nowadays most physicists accept the theory as intrinsically probabilistic,
but well known problems remain, regarding quantum measurements and
the quantum-classical transition [Aul00, WZ14]. They have gained new
relevance as experimental and theoretical developments, such as Quantum
Computation and Quantum Information Theory [NC10], have extended
the limits of quantum theory from the microscopic world to increasingly
larger scales.
An alternative to CQM which is particularly well suited to be applied
to macroscopic systems is the Many Worlds Interpretation, or Everettian
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Quantum Mechanics (EQM) [EI57, DG73]. It rejects the Measurement
Postulate (and, with it, the Born rule), and reinterprets quantum mea-
surements in terms of quantum entanglements, with all possible results
actually happening, but entangled to different states of the observer, in a
quantum superposition of distinct branches or worlds. As EQM is deter-
ministic, it faces the problem of explaining the apparent randomness of
quantum experiments, and the probability values observed.
Many attempts have been made to obtain the Born rule from more
fundamental principles. The most famous is Gleason’s theorem [Gle57],
but it relies on a hypothesis which can not be justified, in EQM, before we
know how probabilities can emerge in the theory. Deutsch and Wallace’s
use of decision theory [Deu99, Wal12] has gained some acceptance among
Everettians, but their hypotheses are also problematic [Man19a].
We present a new approach to the Born rule in EQM, identifying its
probability values as being the factors by which 2-dimensional Lebesgue
measures in a ray (the complex line of a quantum state) contract when
projected onto the eigenspaces of an observable. A Complex Pythagorean
Theorem [Man19b] implies such measures are preserved when projected
onto all eigenspaces, corresponding to the unit total probability condition.
Such projection factors satisfy Kolmogorov’s axioms, but this is not
enough to ensure they are indeed probabilities. This brings the question
of what are probabilities, a notoriously difficult problem even in classical
settings, for which none of the available answers (such as the frequentist
and Bayesian interpretations) is fully satisfactory [Gil00, Mel05].
To properly link such factors to probabilities in EQM, we adopt hy-
potheses that, despite their simplicity, go against common points of view:
• each element of a ray represents a distinct physical state, even if
they are experimentally indistinguishable;
• the existence of our Universe is not random, i.e. there is some phys-
ical reason for it to exist as it is.
From these we obtain that there must exist a continuum infinity of
identical Universes. As EQM is deterministic, they evolve in exactly the
same way. When a quantum experiment is carried out in one of them, it is
also performed in all others, producing the same worlds in all of them, so
in the end there is an infinity of worlds for each measurement result. We
show that, in any set of Universes, of finite nonzero Lebesgue measure, the
relative amount (also in terms of the Lebesgue measure) of worlds with a
given result equals the corresponding projection factor.
Thus, the fraction of all worlds with some result equals the proba-
bility value that would have been attributed to it by the Born rule. As
such fractions can be linked to probabilities, in both the frequentist and
Bayesian interpretations of such concept, the probability problem of EQM
is solved. This in turn fixes an important flaw in a proposed solution to
its preferred basis problem [Man18b, Wal12].
Our results actually provide a better interpretation for the concept
of probability, at least for quantum experiments, which we call quantum
fractionalism. If, as we discuss, classical probabilities can be traced back
to quantum origins, this might provide an answer as to what is the nature
of probability in general.
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Section 2 reviews the problems of the Copenhagen and Everettian
quantum theories, and of the frequentist and Bayesian interpretations of
probability. In section 3 we show the probability values of the Born rule
correspond to projection factors, and obtain the Complex Pythagorean
Theorem. In section 4 such factors are linked to the relative amounts of
worlds for each result of a quantum measurement. In section 5 we show
they can indeed be interpreted as probabilities. We conclude with a few
remaks in section 6.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we review Everett’s theory in its modern form, which brings
decoherence into the fold, the problems of CQM that motivated it, and
the new ones it brings. We also briefly review the frequentist and Bayesian
concepts of probability and their difficulties.
2.1 Problems of the Copenhagen interpretation
Despite its experimental success and wide acceptance, CQM has well
known theoretical problems [Aul00, WZ14].
One is the measurement problem: even if it reflects accurately what is
observed in experiments, the Measurement Postulate is ambiguous. It sets
measurements apart from all other quantum processes, as only in them
evolution governed by Schro¨dinger’s equation gives way to the probabilis-
tic collapse of the quantum state. But there is no clear definition of which
characteristics a process should have to count as a quantum measurement.
If it is an issue of a macroscopic system interacting with a microscopic
one, how big is macroscopic enough? Does it have to involve conscious be-
ings or can inanimate matter perform measurements? If the microscopic
system, measuring device and observer are just agglomerates of particles
interacting according to quantum laws, there ought to be an explanation
of what triggers the change in their evolution from one governed by a
deterministic equation to a probabilistic one. Also, how exactly does the
collapse of the wavefunction occur?
This is directly connected to the problem of the quantum-classical
transition. What is the range of applicability of Quantum Mechanics?
It works for microscopic systems, but what happens as the number of
particles increases? Does it gradually turn into Classical Mechanics, as
is the case with Relativity as velocities decrease? Some quantum rela-
tions turn into classical ones if we take averages and let ~ → 0, but not
everything transitions well. In the usual view, macroscopic quantum su-
perpositions should not happen, lest we observe Schro¨dinger cats, but it is
not clear what might eliminate them as systems get bigger. Decoherence
has been suggested as a solution [Sch07], but even if it eliminates inter-
ference between components of a macroscopic superposition it does not
explain the disappearance of all but one of them. This has led some to
believe Quantum Mechanics is not an universal theory, being applicable
only to microscopic systems, with a more general theory being needed to
connect quantum and classical physics.
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For a long time most physicists have brushed aside such difficulties,
believing that these were philosophical questions with little physical rel-
evance, that they had been settled in the famous Bohr-Einstein debate,
or that these were minor flaws in an otherwise very precise theory, which
would end up being fixed. But as quantum theory reaches its centenary
the problems remain, and gain increasing relevance as new theoretical and
experimental advances allow us to explore the limits of the theory in ways
that would have been inconceivable a few decades ago.
2.2 Everettian Quantum Mechanics
In [EI57, DG73], H. Everett III took a fresh look at what would happen
if Quantum Mechanics was applied to macroscopic systems and measure-
ments were regular quantum processes, proposing what became known as
the Many Worlds Interpretation, or Everettian Quantum Mechanics. In
it, Quantum Mechanics is an universal theory, but the Measurement Pos-
tulate is rejected, with all systems evolving deterministically at all times
according to Schro¨dinger’s equation. He noted that even though this leads
to macroscopic superpositions, it does not contradict our classical experi-
ence, as it also explains why observers do not perceive them.
In EQM, a quantum measurement branches the Universe into distinct
“worlds”, with all possible results happening in some of them. There is
no collapse of the quantum state, but when an observer interacts with the
outcome of an experiment he also splits into many versions of himself, each
seeing only the result of his branch, as if the collapse had happened. This
may seem like an almost mystical departure from conventional quantum
theory, but it is a direct consequence of the usual formalism (minus the
Measurement Postulate) applied to macroscopic systems. Linearity of
Schro¨dinger’s equation and algebraic properties of the tensor product lead
naturally to branching.
Let us detail Everett’s view. In EQM, a measurement is just quantum
entanglement of the measuring device with whatever is being measured.
More precisely, a measuring device for a basis {|i〉} of a system is any
apparatus, in a quantum state |D〉, interacting in such a way that, if the
system is in state |i〉, the composite state evolves as
|i〉 ⊗ |D〉 7−→ |i〉 ⊗ |Di〉 ,
where |Di〉 is a new state of the device, registering result i (or simply
reflecting in some way the fact that it interacted with |i〉). Linearity of
Schro¨dinger’s equation implies that, if the system is in a superposition
|Ψ〉 = ∑i ci |i〉, the composite state evolves as
|Ψ〉 ⊗ |D〉 =
(∑
i
ci |i〉
)
⊗ |D〉 7−→
∑
i
ci |i〉 ⊗ |Di〉 . (1)
This final state is to be accepted as an actual quantum superposition
of macroscopic states. But it will not be perceived as such by an observer
looking at the device, as, by the same argument, his state |O〉 will evolve
into a superposition,(∑
i
ci |i〉 ⊗ |Di〉
)
⊗ |O〉 7−→
∑
i
ci |i〉 ⊗ |Di〉 ⊗ |Oi〉 , (2)
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with |Oi〉 being a state in which he saw result i. This is interpreted as
meaning he has split into different versions of himself, each seeing a result.
By linearity, the components |i〉 ⊗ |Di〉 ⊗ |Oi〉 evolve independently,
and interference is negligible if they are distinct enough, as tends to be
the case with macroscopic systems. Each |Oi〉 evolves as if the initial state
had been |i〉 ⊗ |D〉 ⊗ |O〉, so he does not feel the splitting or the existence
of his other versions, and to him it is as if the system had collapsed to
|i〉. Each component is called a world or branch, and this evolution of one
world into a superposition of many is called branching. So in EQM all
possible results of a measurement do happen, but in different worlds.
The problems of CQM disappear in EQM, but new ones come along,
such as the preferred basis and probability problems, described below.
2.2.1 The preferred basis problem
The preferred basis problem is how to find a natural way to decompose
a macroscopic quantum state into branches behaving like the classical
reality we observe (even if not all of them, and not all the time).
Decoherence is seen as a possible mechanism through which a (quasi-)
classical world might emerge from a quantum Universe [JZK+03, Sch07,
Zur02], and a combination of the decoherent histories formalism [GMH90,
GMH93] with EQM has been proposed by D. Wallace [Wal12] to solve
the preferred basis problem. But this requires a prior solution to EQM’s
probability problem [Bak07, DT15], as the probabilistic interpretation of
quantum state norms is used to justify approximations in decoherence.
Wallace claims such norms can be used as measures of significance even
without probabilities, but in [Man18b] we contest his arguments. We
have suggested, as an alternative, that branches with tiny norms can not
exist as independent worlds, due to interference from larger ones. Hanson
[Han03] has presented a similar idea, with different justifications, but there
is still work to do before either proposal can solve the problem.
Anyway, it seems plausible that a branch decomposition, if it can be
obtained, should be along these lines. An important characteristic of such
decoherence based approach is that the decomposition is not clear-cut
or unique. In EQM measurements lose their special status, becoming
just interactions that produce quantum entanglement. But particles get
entangled all the time, and if each such process counts as a measurement
of a particle by another then branching becomes a pervasive phenomenon,
with each world splitting all the time into a myriad of branches. Also, lots
of branches will be nearly identical, differing only in the states of a few
particles, which is not enough to ensure they would evolve with negligible
interference.
These difficulties can be solved by a coarse-graining of similar branches,
which provides more stability to the branch decomposition and ensures
the resulting worlds are distinct enough to have almost no interference.
But this introduces an element of arbitrariness into the decomposition, as
the resulting worlds would depend on the chosen fineness of grain.
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2.2.2 The probability problem
When measuring |Ψ〉 = ∑i ci |i〉, in EQM, any result with ci 6= 0 is
obtained with certainty, in some world(s). The probability problem is to
reconcile this with experiments, which suggest results are probabilistic
and follow the Born rule.
Born Rule. In CQM, the probability of obtaining result i when measuring
a normalized state |Ψ〉 = ∑i ci |i〉 in an orthonormal basis {|i〉} is
pΨ,i = |ci|2 = |〈i|Ψ〉|2. (3)
The problem has a qualitative aspect: how can probabilities emerge
in a deterministic theory? In classical mechanics processes can appear
random due to ignorance of details, but in EQM we must explain the
apparent randomness even if the quantum state and its evolution are
perfectly known. Wallace [Wal12] defends an operational and functional
definition of probability, via decision theory and Bayesian inference.
Vaidman [Vai98] claims there is a self-locating uncertainty in the time
between processes (1) and (2), as branching has already happened, but
each version of |O〉 is still ignorant as to which branch he is in. But for this,
the mathematical identity
(∑
i ci |i〉⊗|Di〉
)⊗|O〉 = ∑i ci |i〉⊗|Di〉⊗|O〉
must have a very strong physical interpretation: that each measurement
splits the whole Universe at once, so that in this state there are already
several versions of the observer, even though they are all identical.
We think it is more plausible to view branches as local macroscopic
superpositions, which spread as new systems interact with previously
branched ones. So at the beginning of (2) only the device has branched,
and there is still a single version of the observer, who only branches once
each |Di〉 affects him in a different way. In other words, if branching is
the result of measurement, which is just entanglement, the observer does
not branch until he gets entangled with the device. If after (1) he is asked
to guess what was the result of the measurement in his branch, he should
say the question is meaningless, as relative to him there is still only a
single branch (which nevertheless contains a local superposition of device
states, with all results, but which has not affected him yet).
Another aspect of the probability problem is quantitative: accounting
for the probability values. The idea that a measurement with n results
produces n branches may seem natural for EQM, leading to probability 1
n
for each, in disagreement with experiments. Wallace [Wal12] dismisses this
by saying there is no good way to count branches. A measurement with
2 results can lead to more than 2 branches, as unpredictable extraneous
interactions can cause additional branchings, with an uneven and shifting
distribution between the results. Coarse-graining reduces and stabilizes
the number of branches, but makes it somewhat arbitrary, depending on
the chosen fineness of grain.
Everett [EI57] proved that if a measure can be attributed to branches,
and satisfies some hypotheses (like being preserved under finer decom-
positions), it must agree with the values in (3). And, as the number
of measurements tends to infinity, the total measure of branches deviat-
ing from the Born rule tends to 0. But for finite experiments this only
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means branches deviating beyond a given error have small measure, and
without a probabilistic interpretation (to avoid circularity) this does not
mean they are any less relevant. The same problem affects a similar idea
by Graham [Gra73], as well as Wallace’s use of decoherence to solve the
preferred basis problem.
Gleason’s theorem [Gle57] also implies the Born rule, assuming the
probability of a branch does not depend on what other branches the de-
composition basis has (i.e. if a state decomposes as ψ = ψ1 + ψ2 or
ψ = ψ1 + ψ3 + ψ4, depending on the basis chosen, the probability for ψ1
should be the same in both). Though such hypothesis seems reasonable if
one has the Born rule in mind, it is not natural for probability measures
in general (it is violated by a counting measure, for example).
Until we know how probabilities can emerge in EQM, we can not
assume they satisfy Everett’s or Gleason’s hypotheses, so their argu-
ments are not enough to solve the probability problem. Other attempts
[AL88, BHZ06, Zur05] have been made to obtain the right probabilities,
without much success. An idea that has gained some acceptance is the
use of Decision Theory to explain the Born rule in terms of subjective
probabilities [Deu99, Wal12], but it faces many difficulties [Man19a].
2.3 Theories of probability
Though we all seem to have, in most cases, an intuitive understanding of
what probabilistic statements mean, it is notoriously difficult to describe
precisely what probability is. Formally it can be defined as a function
in an event space satisfying Kolmogorov’s axioms, but this is not enough
to connect such functions to how probabilities are actually used in daily
life or science (e.g., areas of regions in a unit square satisfy the axioms,
but are not probabilities per se). In [Gil00, Mel05] one can find differ-
ent approaches to probability, and in [Wal12] Wallace discusses them in
connection with EQM. Here we provide just a brief sketch of the main
interpretations and their problems.
Perhaps the most intuitive concept of probability is the frequentist
one. In this interpretation, saying each result of a fair die has probability
1
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means that, as the die is cast an increasingly large number of times, the
relative frequency of each result will tend to 1
6
.
Making precise sense of this is trickier than it seems. Even if we were
to throw the die 6 million times, we can not say each result will occur
1 million times, give or take a thousand, only that it is highly probable
this will happen. So even if relative frequencies can be used to measure
probabilities, there is a circularity in using them to define probability.
Another problem with such concept is that it depends on the possibility
of repeating some test an arbitrary number of times, under the same
conditions. But the same die thrown 6 million times might get damaged
along the way, breaking its symmetry. Worse yet, frequentism does not
apply to one time events: it can not explain what it means to talk about
the probability that a given candidate will win next election, or that stock
prices will rise tomorrow.
Another approach to probabilities is the Bayesian one. Roughly speak-
ing, in this interpretation if someone says the probability of getting result
7
6 in a die is 1
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all that is meant is that he would not be willing to bet
on such result at odds worse than 5 to 1. Another person, believing the
die is loaded, might accept worse odds, and for him the probability would
be different. Instead of being an objective concept, in the Bayesian view
probability only describes the credence one has about something, based
on the information he has. As more data becomes available, a process of
Bayesian updating allows probability values to be properly adjusted.
Such subjective view of probabilities is useful when frequentism fails,
as in the election or stock market examples, but it may be harder to
apply in cases where probabilities seem to have a more objective nature
(e.g. the decay probability of an atom). In truth, the distinction between
objective and subjective probabilities is not as irreconcilable as it seems.
It can be argued that, under certain rational constraints, and with enough
information, they should not differ significantly.
Still, it seems odd to define the probability of an atom decaying in
terms of one’s willingness to bet on it. If he bases his decision on what
Physics tells are the objective probabilities, it brings back the problem
of what these mean. If, instead, we define objective probabilities to be
the values to which his subjective probabilities converge through Bayesian
updating, as he learns from a large number of such bets, it also leads to
the question of what is it that he is learning about.
As discussed, in EQM a crude frequentist attempt to get probabilities
by world counting would give wrong values, but fortunately it can not
work since the number of worlds is ill defined. Wallace claims Bayesianism
works better in EQM than in the classical case, with rational constraints
forcing subjective probabilities to agree with the Born rule [Wal12]. But
even though his proof is formally sound [Man18a], the concepts and axioms
on which it is based are quite problematic [Man19a]. As we will show,
EQM may indeed provide the best setting for a good probability concept,
but it will be through other means.
3 Complex Pythagorean Theorem
The Pythagorean theorem has known generalizations involving areas, vol-
umes or higher dimensional measures [CB74, YLL90], usually relating a
squared measure to the squared measures of its orthogonal projections
on a complete set of mutually orthogonal subspaces. For complex spaces,
there are similar generalizations in which, for dimensional reasons, the
measures are not squared. Here we present a particular case, referring to
[Man19b] for details and more general formulations.
Let H be a complex Hilbert space, with Hermitian product 〈·, ·〉. Com-
plex vector spaces have underlying real ones, with twice the dimension,
and the real part of 〈·, ·〉 gives a real inner product. As C-orthogonality
(with respect to 〈·, ·〉) implies R-orthogonality (with respect to Re〈·, ·〉),
orthogonal projections with respect to both products coincide.
A complex line is a 1-dimensional complex subspace L ⊂ H. The
complex line of a nonzero v ∈ H is Cv = {cv : c ∈ C}. As it is isometric
to a real plane, we measure its subsets using the 2-dimensional Lebesgue
measure (roughly speaking, the area), which we denote by |·|2.
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Definition. The projection factor of a complex line L ⊂ H on a complex
subspace W ⊂ H is
piL,W =
|P (U)|2
|U |2 ,
where U ⊂ L is any Lebesgue measurable subset with 0 < |U |2 <∞, and
P : L→W is the orthogonal projection.
As P is linear, piL,W does not depend on the choice of U (this is one
of the defining properties of the Lebesgue measure [Rud86]).
Proposition 3.1. Given v ∈ H and a complex subspace W ⊂ H,
‖Pv‖2 = ‖v‖2 · piCv,W , (4)
where P : Cv →W is the orthogonal projection.
Proof. As P is C-linear, the square of sides v and iv in Cv projects to the
square of sides Pv and iPv in W .
Definition. An orthogonal partition of H is a collection {Wi} of mutually
orthogonal closed complex subspaces such that H =
⊕
iWi.
Theorem 3.2 (Complex Pythagorean Theorem). For any nonzero v ∈ H
and any orthogonal partition H =
⊕
iWi,∑
i
piCv,Wi = 1. (5)
So, for any measurable set U ⊂ Cv,∑
i
|Pi(U)|2 = |U |2, (6)
where Pi : Cv →Wi is the orthogonal projection.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 3.1, as ‖v‖2 = ∑
i
‖Piv‖2.
Contrary to the usual Pythagorean theorem, in this complex version
the measures are not squared. The reason is that 1 complex dimension
corresponds to 2 real ones, both contracting by the same factor when
projected on complex subspaces.
When v is a quantum state vector and W is an eigenspace of some
observable, (4) shows piCv,W has the same value as the probability given
by the Born rule for the corresponding eigenvalue. And (5) corresponds
to the condition of unit total probability. Of course, this does not allow
us to interpret projection factors as probabilities yet, specially in EQM,
which has no Born rule. Reaching such interpretation will require a few
more steps.
4 Relative amounts of worlds
Next we show that projection factors give, in EQM, the relative amounts
of worlds corresponding to each result of a quantum measurement. For
this we need some physical assumptions.
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4.1 Distinct physically equivalent states
Let H be the Hilbert space of a quantum system. Since, by quantum laws,
any observable property of Ψ ∈ H also holds for any other cΨ (c ∈ C∗),
these are usually considered different mathematical representations of the
same physical state.
This allows the preferred use of normalized states, which simplify some
formulas, but are not physically special in any way. Claims that normal-
ization is necessary to have total probability 1 are unfounded: without
it, instead of |Ψ〉 = ∑i ci |i〉 we can simply write Ψ = ∑i ψi, where
ψi = ci |i〉, and replace (3) with
pΨ,i =
|〈ψi|Ψ〉|2
‖ψi‖2 ‖Ψ‖2
=
‖ψi‖2
‖Ψ‖2 . (7)
Also, normalization does not eliminate all redundancy in the mathemati-
cal representation of quantum states, as those differing by a phase factor
are also physically equivalent.
As there is no canonical way to pick a representative in each equiva-
lence class, many physicists prefer to describe a quantum state by a ray
RΨ = {cΨ: c ∈ C∗}, instead of a single vector. The set of rays is a pro-
jective Hilbert space, whose rich geometry provides nice interpretations to
concepts like the Berry phase [BZ˙17]. But linear combinations of rays are
not defined, making it hard to even talk about the superposition principle,
which some replace by a decomposition one [Boy89]: instead of writing
|Ψ〉 = ∑i ci |i〉, one says RΨ decomposes in the rays Ri = {c |i〉 : c ∈ C∗},
and an angular distance between RΨ and Ri is used instead of ci. Such
complications cause even proponents of such approach to often go back
to writing sums of quantum states.
In any case, it is generally agreed that having infinitely many Hilbert
space vectors describing the same quantum state is only a redundancy of
the mathematical formalism, with no physical implications.
We will take a different view, assuming each element of RΨ represents
a distinct physical state, even if no experiment can tell them apart. One
might say that experimentally indistinguishable states can not be consid-
ered different, but a similar argument would imply all electrons are not
only identical particles, but actually a single particle present in multiple
locations. Besides, even if one can not distinguish these states experimen-
tally, we will show that the assumption that they are not the same has
important physical consequences.
4.2 Fractions or densities of worlds
Suppose the Universe is in state Ψ, with branch decomposition Ψ =
∑
i ψi
in terms of mutually orthogonal states ψi. In the usual Everettian view,
there is a single quantum Universe, composed of (quasi-)classical worlds
corresponding to the ψi’s. We assume instead (leaving for section 4.3
the discussion of why this may be reasonable) that there is actually a
continuum of identical Universes, one for each state in RΨ. For each i
there is then a continuum Ri = {cψi : c ∈ C∗} of physically equivalent
worlds, one in each Universe.
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We want to show that (7) gives, in some sense, the relative amount
of worlds of type i. Quantifying amounts of worlds requires a measure,
and with a continuum of them, a counting measure makes even less sense
than before. One might consider counting rays instead of worlds, but then
Wallace’s argument applies: the number of rays is ill defined, depending
on the choice of coarse-graining in the branch decomposition.
Each ray is isometric to a 2-dimensional Euclidean space (minus the
origin), and its points are all equivalent. So the natural measure to use is
the Lebesgue one, |·|2, which is invariant by the group of transformations
that preserve the metric1.
As a ray has infinite measure, we consider first a subset of Universes
U ⊂ RΨ with 0 < |U |2 <∞. The set of worlds of type i in Universes of U
is WU,i = Pi(U), where Pi : CΨ → Cψi is the orthogonal projection, and
the set of all worlds in all Universes of U is a disjoint union WU =
⋃
iWU,i.
As |WU |2 = ∑i |WU,i|2 = |U |2, by (6), the fraction fU,i (as measured by
|·|2) of worlds of type i in U is
fU,i =
|WU,i|2
|WU |2 =
|Pi(U)|2
|U |2 = piCΨ,Cψi , (8)
which is independent of U . So, even if the amounts of worlds in the Ri’s
can not be directly compared using their full measures, which are infinite,
their relative amounts are well defined by the following quantifiers.
Definition. The fraction of worlds of type i in the Universes of RΨ is
fΨ,i = lim
r→∞
fUr,i, where Ur = {Ψ˜ ∈ RΨ : ‖Ψ˜‖ < r}.
The density of worlds of type i in the Universes of RΨ is the number
δΨ,i such that |WU,i|2 = δΨ,i · |WU |2 for any measurable subset U ⊂ RΨ.
Both are equivalent, as fΨ,i = δΨ,i = piCΨ,Cψi , and which one to use is
a matter of linguistic preference. From now on, when referring to relative
amounts of worlds in expressions like “in nearly all worlds”, “in almost
no world”, etc., we mean the value of these quantifiers is close to 1, to 0,
and so on. The percentage of worlds of type i in RΨ is fΨ,i · 100%.
By Proposition 3.1, these quantifiers have the same value as (7),
fΨ,i = δΨ,i =
‖ψi‖2
‖Ψ‖2 .
So it seems what we perceive as probabilities in quantum experiments
are just the relative amounts of worlds corresponding to each result. In
section 5 we further investigate this relation.
Example. Let Ψ = c1ψ1 + c2ψ2, where ψ1 and ψ2 are normalized
2 or-
thogonal states, and c1, c2 ∈ C with |c1|2 + |c2|2 = 1. Any set of Universes
U ⊂ RΨ decomposes into a set W1 ∪W2 of worlds (Figure 1), with an
amount of worlds |W1|2 = |c1|2·|U |2 in Rψ1 , and |W2|2 = |c2|2·|U |2 in Rψ2 .
Hence |W1 ∪W2|2 = |W1|2 + |W2|2 = |U |2, so that the fraction of worlds
in Rψ1 is fΨ,1 =
|W1|2
|W1∪W2|2 = |c1|
2, and in Rψ2 is fΨ,2 =
|W2|2
|W1∪W2|2 = |c2|
2.
1Positive multiples of |·|2 also satisfy this, but our results are not affected by it.
2This is just to reframe our result in the usual quantum notation.
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Figure 1: Complex Pythagorean Theorem, |U |2 = |W1|2 + |W2|2.
4.3 A continuum infinity of Universes
Before proceeding, let us justify our assumption that there is a continuum
of identical Universes.
Without the measurement postulate, Quantum Mechanics becomes
fully deterministic, and with it all fundamental laws of Physics, so there
is no randomness anymore in the evolution of the Universe. Taking this
a step further, we assume the initial conditions of the Universe (if there
was a beginning) were also not random, but determined by some unknown
physical law.
This may seem too unorthodox: in Physics one is usually free to choose
the initial conditions of a problem, with determinism governing evolution
only after such starting point. But applying this paradigm to the Universe
is problematic: if its initial conditions were not determined by Physics,
how were they chosen? In EQM we can not appeal to random quantum
fluctuations as a way for the Universe to spontaneously come into exis-
tence. As the theory is not probabilistic, such fluctuations would have
to be reinterpreted as a quantum superposition of all possible beginnings,
which would evolve into a superposition of all possible Universes, and the
initial superposition would still require an explanation.
Our hypothesis can be made more precise by assuming there is some
special Big Bang or seed state Ψ0, which not only can, but actually must,
give rise to an Universe. As any other state in the ray RΨ0 is physically
equivalent to Ψ0, it must also give rise to another Universe, so we end
up with a whole ray of Universes. Determinism ensures they evolve in
synchrony: if at time t our Universe is in state Ψ(t), the states of all
Universes will form the ray RΨ(t).
Even if there was no Big Bang and our Universe always existed, it
is enough to assume its existence is not random, i.e. that there is some
unknown physical reason for it to exist in some specific state at some
time. The argument can also be readily adapted to accommodate a “block
Universe” relativistic perspective.
Of course, our present knowledge does not allow us to talk with any
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certainty about what it even means to say a Universe exists; if there can
be more than one; whether and why did it start; what is the real nature
of time and evolution; or if there is a quantum state of the Universe.
But these difficulties are not specific to EQM or to our approach, and
if Physics is ever to address such questions we must advance hypotheses
and see if they lead to reasonable conclusions. Our assumptions, even
if they seem like a radical deviation from traditional physical views, are
actually quite simple, and might lead to a better understanding of both
Quantum Mechanics and Probability. This should be reason enough to
consider their plausibility, and maybe see if they provide new insights into
those questions.
5 Quantum Fractionalism
Our last step is to show that relative amounts of worlds can really be
interpreted as probabilities.
Let us review the different Everettian points of view in an example.
When an observer |O〉 measures, in the orthonormal basis {|↑〉 , |↓〉}, an
electron spin in state c1 |↑〉+ c2 |↓〉, with |c1|2 + |c2|2 = 1 (for simplicity),
the process leads to an entangled state
c1 |↑〉 |O↑〉+ c2 |↓〉 |O↓〉 .
A naive world counter would claim there are 2 worlds, one with each
result, and make wrong predictions. But if worlds emerge through deco-
herence, the final state must take into account the many ways the observer
can get entangled with the environment, so we actually have∑
i
c1i |↑〉 |O↑i〉 |Ei〉+
∑
j
c2j |↓〉 |O↓j〉 |Ej〉 , (9)
with
∑
i |c1i|2 = |c1|2 and
∑
j |c2j |2 = |c2|2. A coarse-graining is necessary
to separate each sum into worlds having negligible interference. As the
number of worlds in each one depends on the chosen fineness of grain, it
is not an objective feature, and can not be used to claim EQM leads to
wrong statistics.
In our view, (9) is just a representative of an actual continuum infinity
of indistinguishable Universes. As each one decomposes into worlds, we
get many continua of worlds for each result, but in such a way that the
total fraction (or density, if one prefers) of those with |↑〉 is f↑ = |c1|2,
and those with |↓〉 have f↓ = |c2|2 = 1− f↑.
If the experiment is repeated N times, the total fraction of worlds with
n ups and N − n downs will be (N
n
) · fn↑ · (1 − f↑)N−n, corresponding to
a binomial distribution with parameter p = f↑. Thus, for large N , the
distribution of world fractions, in terms of the frequency f = n
N
of ups,
becomes sharply peaked at f = f↑, with variance σ2 =
f↑f↓
N
. Even though
every possible sequence of results does occur in some world (actually, in
continuum infinities of them), in nearly 99.7% of all worlds (as measured
by their fractions or densities) the frequency of results will deviate from
the Born rule by at most 3σ.
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So, when observed frequencies are used to measure probabilities, in
quantum experiments, what is actually being measured are the fractions
with which worlds branch at each run of the experiment. We call quantum
fractionalism (or densitism) this interpretation of quantum probabilities
as being in fact branching fractions or densities. It provides a physically
objective concept of probability, that works equally well for single or mul-
tiple runs, encompassing both the frequentist and Bayesian views (at least
for quantum experiments).
For example, if I bet a single measurement of 0.6 |↑〉+0.8 |↓〉 will result
up, saying I have a 36% “chance” of winning has a concrete meaning:
after Universes branch, I will have won in 36% of all resulting worlds.
If 10 000 measurements like this are performed, every sequence of results
will happen in an infinity of worlds, but in 99.7% of them the relative
frequency of ups will be close to 36% (±3σ ∼= 1.4%).
Likewise, the half-life of caesium-137 being around 30 years means
that, after such period, in nearly all (fractionwise) worlds approximately
half the atoms of a sample of this material will have decayed. But there
will also be an infinity of worlds (albeit representing an extremely low
fraction or density) in which all atoms have decayed, and another in which
none have. How should we interpret this?
As in CQM these are real possibilities, only extremely unlikely, having
in EQM a tiny fraction of worlds in which they happen might not be
so strange. Still, perhaps due to the human tendency to equate very
low probabilities with impossibility, it may seem less than satisfying that
all sorts of unbelievable events should always take place in an infinity of
worlds. A possible way out is that, as suggested in [Man18b], branches
with norm orders of magnitude lower than the rest might not form stable
classical worlds, as interference from larger ones precludes macroscopic
causality in them. So, in the quantum case, extremely low probability
(fraction or density, to be precise) might indeed equal impossibility.
5.1 Relation to classical probabilities
Can quantum fractionalism tell us anything about probabilities in classical
settings? In EQM, our “classical” world is in essence quantum mechan-
ical, so it may seem that classical probabilities should admit the same
interpretation as quantum ones. But the apparent classicality of a system
depends on the absence of a crucial ingredient for quantum probabilities:
branching.
When a fair die is cast, does the Universe branch so that each result
happens in 1/6 of all worlds? Not necessarily: if one gently releases the
die just above a table there is no reason to expect the Universe will branch
into all 6 results. Even a good roll of the die is usually considered a purely
classical process, in the sense that given sufficiently detailed data about its
initial state (but not so precise as to require a quantum description), one
could in principle predict the result. If such classical determinism is an
actual feature of the process then there is no branching, and probabilities
due to ignorance about initial conditions (assuming they are classicaly
well defined) bear no relation to quantum fractionalism.
On the other hand, branching is basically a gradual amplification of
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entangled quantum superpositions from a microscopic to a macroscopic
scale, until components are distinct enough to have negligible interference.
As the position and velocity with which the die is thrown depend on signals
the hand receives from the brain, as a result of a myriad of neuronal
chemical reactions, it is conceivable that quantum superpositions from
such reactions might accumulate, generating a superposition of signals,
which the hand+die system amplifies into macroscopically distinct results.
One might argue that quantum effects can not play any significant role
in biological systems: as these are not isolated decoherence should elimi-
nate quantum superpositions almost immediately. But in our case this is
not a problem, as in EQM decoherence does not destroy components of a
quantum superposition, it only separates them into independent worlds,
which is precisely what we need.
Let us examine this in more detail. Chemical reactions are messy,
especially in biological systems, depending on which molecules are present,
in which quantities, which reagent molecules come in contact, and how
they interact. One might predict the result statistically, which in EQM
translates into a superposition of all possibilities. Each possible set M of
molecular reactions generates a certain signal SM , leaving the brain in a
different state and releasing some amount of heat into the environment,
so the result of all possible reactions can be described as a superposition∑
M
cM |SM 〉 |EM 〉 , (10)
where EM is the state of the environment (taken to include the brain).
For each M there will be others with only a few distinct reactions,
so their signals, and their effects on the environment, might be nearly
identical. Even a coarse-graining might not be enough to separate (10)
into independent branches, so we call this a pre-branching state: an almost
continuous superposition of similar states, but whose differences can be
amplified by some apparatus (in our case, the hand+die system) into
macroscopically distinct branches.
As the superposition of signals reaches the hand, it is translated into
a superposition of slightly different movements, each imparting to the die
some initial data I. This produces a superposition of initial states |DI〉
for the die, entangled to states |EI〉 of the environment (including the
hand), which can be approximated by an integral∫
R
k(I) |DI〉 |EI〉 dI
over a small region R of phase space, with |k(I)|2 giving the so called initial
“probability” distribution of the die. Unless R is too small (as when the
die is released just above the table), it will spread through phase space as
the die bounces and rolls, covering all 6 results, which will then happen
in different branches.
Other “random” classical processes might also be traced back to quan-
tum origins [AP14], with ignorance about initial conditions meaning just
lack of entanglement of the observer with the pre-branching state. In other
words, a process is deemed random if its initial conditions are not well con-
trolled, allowing cumulative quantum effects (possibly of unknown origin,
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and lying well in the past) to produce pre-branchings covering the admissi-
ble initial region of phase space, with the initial “probability” distribution
being simply the fraction (or density) distribution of pre-branches.
Hence classical probabilities might indeed correspond to quantum ones.
If a “random” process is repeated a large number of times with the same
initial fraction distribution, the same argument as before tells us in the
vast majority of worlds the relative frequency of results will agree with
classical predictions for the corresponding probability distribution.
The Bayesian interpretation also becomes clearer in terms of quantum
“probabilities”. Saying there is a 60% chance it will rain tomorrow (or
stocks will rise, or candidate X will be elected) does not mean this will
necessarily happen in 60% of worlds. But it is a subjective estimate,
based on one’s incomplete knowledge about the initial distribution and
its evolution, about a perfectly objective physical fact: the percentage of
worlds in which this will happen due to a cumulative effect of quantum
interactions between particles in the atmosphere (or chemical reactions
in investors’ or voters’ brains). The meaning of Bayesian updating also
becomes more concrete: it improves one’s knowledge about branching
fractions.
6 Final remarks
Assuming our hypotheses are valid, quantum probabilities can be inter-
preted, in EQM, in terms of relative amounts of worlds with each result,
and the same may be true for classical probabilities. With the probability
problem solved, Wallace’s use of decoherence to solve the preferred basis
problem is justified. Hence the main objections to Everettian Quantum
Mechanics are eliminated.
Popper’s falsifiability principle has also been invoked against EQM,
with the claim that it makes no testable predictions differing from CQM.
But as more sophisticated experiments test quantum effects at ever larger
scales, and the original Everettian view is supplemented by new ideas, it
may come a time when this is no longer true. Anyway, if they do make
the same predictions, any test ever made of CQM is also a test of EQM.
Historical antecedence does not make CQM more falsifiable than EQM.
Some critics also wield Occam’s razor against EQM, and they will cer-
tainly not like the idea of a continuum of identical Universes, each with
lots of distinct worlds. But objections against unnecessarily complex ex-
planations only apply if a simpler theory can explain the same facts, while
also being theoretically sound, which is not the case with CQM. Simply
claiming a theory with infinitely many Universes is needlessly complex
is like attacking modern astronomy for requiring billions of galaxies to
coherently explain observations.
Our proposal does rely on unorthodox assumptions. But the history of
Quantum Mechanics is full of ideas (e.g. Bohr’s atomic model) which did
not fit in with the physical knowledge of the time. Some even turned out to
be wrong, but provided the seed for other developments, until there were
enough new ideas to form a whole new paradigm. That problems of the
Copenhagen interpretation still remain a century later suggests another
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paradigm change may be necessary, and new solutions challenging old
conceptions should deserve serious consideration. Even if they turn out
to be not quite right, they might still provide us with clues about what
to look for.
On a final note, we observe that some authors have considered the use
of real ou quaternionic Hilbert spaces in Quantum Mechanics [FJSS62,
Stu60]. Our work shows that, for dimensional reasons, a complex space
may be critical to give the correct probabilities.
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